

NBC BRIEFING

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18 May 1955

~~AFGHAN-PAKISTANI SITUATION~~

Too long

- I. Air full of rumors and counter-rumors that Afghan, or Pak or both have accepted "mediation" offers from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran.
 - A. All these countries have volunteered or been asked to intervene.
 1. Afghan. close to Saudi Arabia and possibly Egypt.
 2. Pak supported by Turkey and Iraq.
 - B. Only firm action to date by Saudi Arabia, which has sent Mahmud, uncle of King, to Kabul and Karachi to talk to parties.
 - C. Not clear yet, however, whether individual country or commission composed of several countries will eventually be accepted by Afghan. and Pak.
 1. Apparent Afghan, Pak fear that single country might favor one side or other will probably result in joint commission if anything formal develops.
- II. Main substantive point becoming clear is that Pak is not weakening demands in accepting third party intervention.
 - A. Pak has refused to negotiate Pushtoonistan question.
 1. Insists investigation consider only 30 March riots and related events.
 - B. Pak obviously foresees investigation of Afghan guilt, not "mediation" between two equally concerned parties.

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III. Most Near East countries appear to side with Pakistan in recognizing Afghan guilt.

A. Turkey has told Afghans it does not consider looting of Pak embassy in Kabul and Pak demonstrations before Afghan consulate in Peshawar in same category.

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B. Iraqi minister [REDACTED] there no doubt Afghan. guilty party re 30 March riots, should make immediate amends.

C. Saudi minister in Kabul apparently hopes for resignation of Afghan prime minister Daud and renunciation of Pushtoonistan policy.

IV. Possibly aware of above, several sources report Daud deeply discouraged over failure of his strong stand and his mobilization of army to inspire any enthusiasm among Afghan tribesmen.

A. Daud reported by both Saudi minister and Egyptian ambassador as willing resign if commission of Non-Aligned nations finds against Pushtoonistan policy.

V. Saudi delegation which arrived Kabul 14 May has apparently introduced new, disturbing element in situation, however.

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A. [REDACTED] Saudis suggest both sides "forgive and forget" without any determination of guilt.

B. Pak amb fears Afghans have poisoned Saudi minds against Pak.

C. This view possibly supported by continued strong Afghan front displayed to foreigners.

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1. May be responsible for 15 May Kabul radio broadcast suggesting Paks hold plebiscite in Pak tribal areas under supervision 3-man commission of Pak, Afghan, and one neutral country.
2. Afghans possibly also encouraged by Paks failure break diplomatic relations and commence economic blockade on 15 May.

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VI. [REDACTED] Kabul also hears Daud must make war, pay impossibly large bonuses to conscriptees taken away from crop planting at critical time, or face revolt on part those conscriptees and their leaders which might result in overthrow royal family.

VII. Situation believed not so alarming as painted.

- A. Paks unlikely to give way to suggestions so damaging to Pak prestige as to make it unlikely Pak could ever again successfully pressure Afghans.
- B. Despite Saudi attitude, bulk of Near East opinion supports Pakistan.
- C. Daud may be restrained by royal family from making war or "turning to USSR."
- D. Considerable question as to how much of army, people would follow Daud if he attempted either of above.
- E. Daud attitude reported above suggests he beginning see folly his course, lays groundwork for repudiation of Pushtoonistan.
 1. If Daud repudiates Pushtoonistan after investigation by Howlen Commission, royal family might consent to his remaining as prime minister.

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